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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the spatial evolution of inter-Korean maritime connections for the last two 
decades. Based on the circulation pattern and capacity of trading vessels‟ movements, it applies the 
Gini coefficient to the ring of external ports connecting North Korea to the outside world. Results show 
the gradual isolation of North Korea and the increased importance of neighboring transit ports through 
three main stages. First, traffics concentrate in global hub ports (Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japanese 
ports). Second, traffics split and spread to closer and smaller transit ports (Busan, Dalian, Nakhodka). 
Third, traffics re-concentrate upon Incheon, South Korea, which has become the dominant load center 
of the North in recent years. One difficulty is therefore whether such spatial shift should be attributed to 
the betterment of inter-Korean relationships (e.g. 2000 summit, maritime agreement) or to the internal 
problems of North Korea in terms of infrastructure decay and lacks of handling capacity at its ports. 
Such research allows complementing port concentration studies by analyzing external hub 
dependence in the case of a collapsing and increasingly isolated economy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout transport geography, the evolution of port system concentration has been widely analyzed 
as a means to understand regional or national changing trade patterns. The degree of traffic 
concentration within a port system illustrates the combination of internal factors (e.g., infrastructure 
investment, port policy) and external factors (e.g., strategies of international players such as shipping 
lines, port competition, hinterland coverage). In particular, some studies have used the Gini coefficient 
to highlight port concentration among port ranges, stemming from economies of scale in transportation 
favoring the concentration of traffic at transport hubs [1] [2] [3] [4].  
This paper proposes a complementary and original approach based on the specific case of North 
Korea. While the concentration of the North Korean port system itself has been analyzed recently [5], 
showing the growing importance of Nampo as Pyongyang‟s gateway, this research focuses more on its 
external connections. Thus, it applies the Gini coefficient to the first “maritime ring” so as to better 
highlight how external ports are used by shipping lines to connect a relatively closed and declining 
country. Such analysis is made possible through accessing data from Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Un it, 
which provides detailed information on 80% of the world‟s commercial fleet in terms of circulation, 
capacities, and other. It is the only reliable and independent source to study port activities in a country 
where scarcity of data is by no means a barrier to research.  
The first part describes the importance of sea transport between the two Koreas. The second part 
analyses port concentration at the maritime ring, and zooms on inter-Korean maritime linkages. The 
third part synthesize the results through evaluating the main factors underlying the observed changes.  
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SEA TRANSPORT AND INTER-KOREAN RELATIONSHIPS 
 
General context 
 
Following the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, economic ties between the Democratic People‟s 
Republic of Korea (hereafter North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) have 
grown up rapidly from almost nothing. Since 2004, South Korea is the second largest trading partner of 
North Korea with 25% of the North‟s total trade, still lagging behind China (39%). Also, two cooperation 
projects have been developed along the border: the industrial park of Gaeseong, where a dozen of 
South Korean companies hire 10,000 North Korean workers, and the International Tourism Free Zone 
of Mount Geumgang, already visited by more than one million South Korean visitors. Despite the peak 
of diplomatic tension due to missile tests and nuclear test in 2006, those projects have been kept 
going, and there are plans to enlarge their capacity.  
Beside this positive trend, other political factors need to be taken into account in order to better 
understand the complexity of inter-Korean relationships. The absence of a sustainable peace on the 
peninsula can only be solved through US agreement if North Korea stops any suspected illicit trade 
and nuclear-based experiments. Because South Korea is seen as the ally of the US, inter-Korean 
dialogue is spasmodic and frequently interrupted on major issues, while the North is kept under 
embargo. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) is thus the physical expression of the political tension between 
different ideologies since 1953. Only a few trucks are allowed to cross the DMZ, notably between 
Seoul region and Gaeseong. The issue of the reconnection of inter-Korean railways has been delayed 
recently [6]. Such barriers give to maritime transport important stakes in sustaining growing trade 
between North and South.  
 
Maritime Transport in a Socialist Country 
 
Maritime transport has never been a top priority in North Korean development for two reasons. First, 
the application of a “Soviet” model to its transportation system has kept sea transport between 10-15% 
of the modal split while rail transport occupies the main part, i.e. at least 70% [7]. Second, the main 
trading partners, China and Russia, are directly accessible by land transport. Although logistics in 
North Korea are gradually facing interregional disrupts such as infrastructure dereliction resulting in 
cost and time overdue to and from Pyongyang [8], still nowadays about 80% of the country‟s exports 
pass through Sinuiju at the border with China. Also, current Chinese strategies at Rajin-Seonbong tend 
to turn the unsuccessful free-trade zone into a new gateway securing direct access to the Pacific [9]. 
Thus, although maritime transport has a secondary role in foreign trade, it is interesting to analyze it 
because it better reflects a degree of internationalization through long-distance relationships. 
According to former examples of economic transition in socialist countries, long-distance maritime 
connections develop rapidly with the intervention of global players that are willing to extend their 
networks worldwide [10] [11] [12], in parallel with shortsea connections. Of course, the deployment of 
trading networks depends on the regime‟s attitude towards the outside world through port 
modernization and institutional reform [13]. Although North Korea is still said to be a closed country, it 
is more a consequence of external pressures than internal strategies. Since 1984 but mostly from 
2002, economic reforms have been launched so as to give more impetus to local entrepreneurship and 
foreign investment. While those reforms do not yet reach the level of those implemented elsewhere, 
they are probably an indication that the opening of North Korea is “underway and probably 
unstoppable” [14].  
 
AN ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL PORT CONCENTRATION 
 
The Gini Coefficient 
 
Vessel capacities in deadweight tonnage (DWT) are summed for every port connected by sea to North 
Korea regardless of inbound or outbound voyage. Such ports are those through which vessels enter or 
leave North Korea before and after calling at its ports. Yearly figures are agglomerated by 3-years 
periods in order to avoid blank values arising from irregular shipping (tramping) that is predominantly 
based on bulky products (raw materials).  
The Gini coefficient expresses the degree of concentration (inequality) of a variable in a distribution of 
its elements. It compares the Lorenz curve of a ranked empirical distribution with the line of perfect 
equality. This line assumes that each element has the same contribution to the total summation of the 
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values of a variable. The Gini coefficient ranges between 0, where there is no concentration (perfect 
equality), and 1 where there is total concentration (perfect inequality). As a complement to Gini 
coefficient, the dissimilarity index is also used to express inequality, and is also known as the 
summation of vertical deviations or „Lorenz differences‟ [15].  
Table 1 shows the dissimilarity index and the Gini concentration coefficient for two different port 
samples. The „main ring‟ is composed of 48 ports having cargo volumes for every period, while the 
„total ring‟ contains a larger number although some ports are irregularly represented. In both rings, 
three stages can be observed: concentration, de-concentration, and concentration. This important 
mutation helps understanding the underlying spatial shift of traffics.  
Figure 1 indicates this evolution for the 10 main transit ports. Singapore, Dalian (China), Niigata 
(Japan) and Hong Kong were dominant until the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and the political 
change after the death of former president Kim Il-Sung (1994). Until the late 1990s, traffics are spread 
more homogeneously while shifting from those global hubs to smaller regional ports. Since then, a new 
period of concentration occurs, selecting closer transit ports such as Nakhodka (Russia), Busan, and 
Incheon (South Korea). Such unprecedented concentration ratios are mainly explained by the growing 
importance of Incheon as the main load center of North Korea. The decline of Japanese transit traffics 
is more of political impact, following the banning of North Korean vessels from Japanese ports due to 
long range missiles test, nuclear weapons development and some suspected illicit activities [16]. 
 
The Multiplication of Inter-Korean Maritime Linkages 
 
In the last two decades, inter-Korean shipments have become of first importance in overall North 
Korea‟s seaborne activity. The trend by product (Figure 2) shows that although there in a regular 
increase of the share of North-South trade in total DPRK trade since the late 1990s, this share has only 
become dominant since 2004. It coincides with the start of the operation of the Gaeseong Industrial 
Complex, sands extraction in Haeju area, graphite exports to South Korea and the signature of the 
inter-Korean maritime agreement. Of all goods by sea, only liquid bulks (oil products, chemicals) have 
been significantly concerned by North-South trade in the 1980s, though very irregularly. Solid bulks, 
passengers and ro-ro (ferry) are still nowadays only secondarily funded on traffics with South Korea, 
due to the sustain of some linkages with other partners. However, container and general cargo, the 
most profitable traffics, are dominated by South Korea. This has several implications for the two 
countries in terms of technological diffusion and integration.  
One striking phenomenon to be observed between the two Koreas is not only the rise of traffics but 
their geographical expansion (Figure 3). The first period is defined by a dominant eastern system 
linking the major poles for heavy industry in the two countries, i.e. Wonsan and Ulsan, based on oil 
refinery and chemicals (e.g. fertilizers) but also Busan, the manufacturing center and port hub of the 
growing South [17]. The second period marks the establishment of two relatively distinct systems with 
dominant DPRK imports in the West and dominants DPRK exports in the East. Each system may be 
defined by a distinct logic, such as humanitarian aid distribution to Nampo and shipment of local 
products to the South. The third period is characterized by a growing complexity in the pattern of 
maritime linkages, with a concentration on the Incheon-Nampo route and the formation of a multi-polar 
network mostly funded on small volumes. This matches the broader trend defined by concentration 
(Ulsan and the East coast), de-concentration (more connections, East-West balance), and re-
concentration (Incheon, the West coast, and continued split).  
 
POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING PORT CONCENTRATION 
 
Ageing infrastructure and lack of investment 
 
As seen in Figure 4, a major trend affecting the evolution of North Korean maritime activity is the 
downsize of average ship capacity since 1991 (collapse of the Soviet Union), in parallel with increasing 
inter-Korean port connections. This means that bigger and non-DPRK ships are fewer and fewer, 
which is totally in contradiction with the trend of globalization in the shipping industry, funded on bigger 
vessels, longer voyages and increased foreign participation. Although total capacity has regained its 
original levels in the late 1990s and early 2000s, average capacity is continuously decreasing. Such 
trends clearly confirm existing assumptions about ageing North Korean ships, outdated port 
infrastructures and excessive shipping costs to and from North Korea [18]. This results in an „X‟ shaped 
trend as more ships of lower capacity are needed to support similar or even smaller cargo volumes. 
Such trend is to some extent similar to the Mediterranean case, where new hubs such as Gioia Tauro 
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have been developed to concentrate traffics of mother vessels, and serve mainland ports through 
feeder vessels. This is observed in several other areas such as Caribbean and South Asia. Also there, 
one main factor is the lack of investment in modern port facilities. Thus, the North Korean case 
confirms the need for carriers to rationalize their services, favoring in turn port concentration at a few 
main load centers. However, the main difference with other countries is that North Korea has become 
unable to ensure regular shipping, resulting in the disappearance of long distance connections, and in 
the dependence upon external, rather than national, load centers.  
 
The development of an integrated inter-Korean maritime network? 
 
Because land-based networks are not well connected, sea transport concentrates 90% of inter-Korean 
trade on a regular basis [19]. This has been partly made possible with the 2004 inter-Korean Maritime 
Agreement that enables the free circulation of both ships within a common area, and the opening of 
new sea lanes between Korean ports [20]. As a result, inter-Korean maritime traffics have hit a record 
of 15.7 million tons and 12,329 TEUs in 2006 [21]. Such importance is also backed by the South 
Korean intentions to modernize North Korean ports, which are suffering from the overall economic 
collapse of the country. Although Incheon and Nampo have signed an agreement in 2005 for 
establishing more shuttle services, projects related to infrastructure have failed until now: the project of 
Hyundai group to develop cruise, shipbuilding and repair at Wonsan [22]; the project of Korea 
Container Terminal Authority (KCTA) to develop a container terminal and freight station at Nampo [23]; 
and the project of an inter-Korean hub at Heungnam [24]. It seems that most port-related investments 
in the North are from China, either in Nampo, the port of Pyongyang, or in Rajin, located at the border 
with China and Russia. Thus, the political will to enhance inter-Korean port cooperation is not yet 
sufficient to launch shared investments in port infrastructures, but it has allowed South Korea to 
become North Korea‟s main transit hub to connecting the outside world.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis of the evolution of inter-Korean maritime networks brings several questions that are 
difficult to answer. On one hand, the betterment of political relationships between the two Koreas has 
allowed more traffic between their respective ports. On the other hand, this phenomenon is influenced 
by a specific context defined by the North‟s internal and external pressures. It may constitute a first 
approach to port concentration in the case of a declining economy, rather than opening economies as 
seen in the case of South China‟s dependence on the Hong Kong hub. For geography and network 
theory, the North Korean case is a fruitful complement to the complex relationships between network 
concentration and economic evolution, through the intervening of: 
 
- Technical factors: shipping lines use the „hub and spoke‟ system to transform the closest 
neighboring ports into transshipment points as a remedy to the lacking capacity of - and the 
reduced direct calls to - North Korea. Incheon is the leading hub due to lower cost and better 
access to North Korea‟s core region via the Nampo load center. Thus, other inter-Korean sea 
routes are dominated by non-commercial and non-regular flows such as aids and tramping;  
- Political factors: growing inter-Korean commercial flows that would normally take place 
inland are shifted to sea lanes due to DMZ blockages. Concentration between Incheon and 
Nampo reflects the expanding ties between Seoul and Pyongyang, while the multiplication of 
other routes depicts the increasing importance of South Korea in the revival of North Korea‟s 
local economies. South Korea is the major sea hub and one important economic enabler of 
technological transfer to - and modernization of - the North, to prepare reunification.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
  1985-
1987 
1988-
1990 
1991-
1993 
1994-
1996 
1997-
1999 
2000-
2002 
2003-
2005 
Main ring 
Dissimilarity index 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.44 
Gini coefficient 0.65 0.61 0.53 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.76 
Number of ports 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Total ring 
Dissimilarity index 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.51 
Gini coefficient 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.76 0.79 
Number of ports 181 166 153 165 186 169 149 
 
Table 1: Evolution of port concentration within North Korea‟s maritime ring 
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Figure 1: North Korea related traffics at main transit ports, 1985-2005 (Unit: DWT) 
Data source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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Figure 2: Geographical evolution of inter-Korean maritime networks, 1985-2005 (Unit: % DWT) 
Data source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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Figure 3: Share of inter-Korean trade in total DPRK sea trade by product, 1985-2005 (% DWT) 
Data source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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Figure 4: Evolutional trends of North Korean shipping, 1985-2005 
Data source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
 
 
 
